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Abstract. The trustless nature of permissionless blockchains renders
overcollateralization a key safety component relied upon by decentral-
ized finance (DeFi) protocols. Nonetheless, factors such as price volatil-
ity may undermine this mechanism. In order to protect protocols from
suffering losses, undercollateralized positions can be liquidated. In this
paper, we present the first in-depth empirical analysis of liquidations
on protocols for loanable funds (PLFs). We examine Compound, one of
the most widely used PLFs, for a period starting from its conception
to September 2020. We analyze participants’ behavior and risk-appetite
in particular, to elucidate recent developments in the dynamics of the
protocol. Furthermore, we assess how this has changed with a modifica-
tion in Compound’s incentive structure and show that variations of only
3% in an asset’s price can result in over 10m USD becoming liquidable.
To further understand the implications of this, we investigate the effi-
ciency of liquidators. We find that liquidators’ efficiency has improved
significantly over time, with currently over 70% of liquidable positions
being immediately liquidated. Lastly, we provide a discussion on how
a false sense of security fostered by a misconception of the stability of
non-custodial stablecoins, increases the overall liquidation risk faced by
Compound participants.
1 Introduction
Decentralized Finance (DeFi) refers to a peer-to-peer, permissionless blockchain-
based ecosystem that utilizes the integrity of smart contracts for the advance-
ment and disintermediation of traditional financial primitives. One of the most
prominent DeFi application on the Ethereum blockchain [21] are protocols for
loanable funds (PLFs) [12]. On PLFs, markets for loanable funds are established
via smart contracts that facilitate borrowing and lending. In the absence of
strong identities on Ethereum, creditor protection tends to be ensured through
overcollateralization, whereby a borrower must provide collateral worth more
than the value of the borrowed amount. In the case where the value of the col-
lateral to debt ratio drops below some liquidation threshold, a borrower defaults
on his position and the supplied collateral is sold off at a discount to cover the
debt in a process referred to as liquidation. However, little is known about the
behavior of agents towards liquidation risk on a PLF. Furthermore, despite liq-
uidators playing a critical role in the DeFi ecosystem, the efficiency with which
they liquidate positions has not yet been thoroughly analyzed.
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In this paper, we first lay out a framework for quantifying the state of a
generic PLF and its markets over time. We subsequently instantiate this frame-
work to all markets on Compound [16], one of the largest PLFs in terms of
locked funds. We analyze how liquidation risk has changed over time, specifi-
cally after the launch of Compound’s governance token. Furthermore, we seek to
quantify this liquidation risk through a price sensitivity analysis. In a discussion,
we highlight the existence of how the interdependence of DeFi protocols can re-
sult in agent behavior undermining the assumptions of the protocols’ incentive
structures.
Contributions. This paper makes the following contributions:
– We present an abstract framework to reason about the state of PLFs.
– We provide an open-source implementation of the proposed framework for
Compound, one of the largest PLFs in terms of total locked funds.
– We perform an empirical analysis on the historical data for Compound, from
May 7, 2019 to September 6, 2020 and make the following observations: i)
despite increases in the number of suppliers and borrowers the total funds
locked is mostly accounted for by a small subset of participants; ii) the in-
troduction of Compound’s governance token had protocol-wide implications
as liquidation risk increased as a consequence of higher risk-seeking behavior
of participants; iii) liquidators became significantly more efficient over time,
liquidating over 70% of liquidable positions instantly.
– By relating to our findings, we emphasize in a discussion how interaction
between protocols’ incentive structures can result in unexpected risks to
participants.
2 Background
In this section we introduce preliminary concepts necessary for understanding
how liquidations function in DeFi on Ethereum.
2.1 Ethereum
On Ethereum, smart contracts are programs written in a Turing-complete lan-
guage, typically in Solidity, that define a set of rules that may be invoked by
any network participant. These programs rely on the Ethereum Virtual Machine
(EVM), a low-level stack machine which executes the compiled EVM bytecode
of a smart contract [21]. Each instruction has a fee represented in a unit called
“gas”, and the total gas cost of a transaction is the sum of all instructions’ gas
and a fixed base fee [5,18]. The sender of a transaction must then set a gas price,
which is the amount of money he is willing to pay per unit of gas to execute the
transaction. The total fee of the transaction is given by the gas price multiplied
with the gas cost [20,19]. Within a transaction, smart contracts can store data
in logs, which are metadata specially indexed as part of the transaction. This
metadata, commonly referred to as events, is typically used to allow users to
monitor the activity of a contract externally.
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2.2 Collateralization
Given the pseudonymity of agents in Ethereum, borrow positions need to be
overcollateralized to reduce the default risk. Thereby, the borrower of an asset
is required to supply collateral, where the total value of the supplied collateral
exceeds the total value of the borrowed asset. For example, in order to borrow
100 USD worth of DAI with ETH as collateral at a collateralization ratio of 150%,
a borrower would have to lock 150 USD worth of ETH to collateralize the borrow
position. Thus, the protocol does not face monetary risk from defaulted borrow
positions, as the underlying collateral of a defaulted position can be sold off to
recover the debt.
2.3 Liquidation
The process of selling a borrower’s collateral to recover the debt value upon de-
fault is referred to as liquidation. A borrow position can be liquidated once the
value of the collateral falls below some fixed liquidation threshold, i.e. the mini-
mum acceptable collateral to debt ratio. Any network participant may liquidate
these positions by purchasing the underlying collateral at a discount. Hence,
liquidators are incentivized to actively monitor borrowers’ collateral to debt ra-
tios. Note that in practice, there may exist a maximum amount of liquidable
collateral that a single liquidator can purchase.
2.4 Protocols for Loanable Funds
In DeFi, asset borrowing and lending is achieved via so-called protocols for loan-
able funds (PLFs), where smart contracts act as trustless intermediaries of loan-
able funds between borrowers and lenders in markets of different assets. Unlike
traditional peer-to-peer lending, deposits are pooled and instantly available to
borrowers. On a DeFi platform, the aggregate of tokens that the PLF smart con-
tracts hold, which equals the difference between supplied funds and borrowed
funds, is termed locked funds [10]. Borrowers are charged interest on the debt
at a floating rate determined by a market’s underlying interest rate model. A
small fraction of the paid interest is allocated to a pool of reserves, which is set
aside in case of market illiquidity, while the remainder is paid out to suppliers of
loanable funds. Interest in a given market is generally accrued through market-
specific, interest-bearing derivative tokens that appreciate against the underlying
asset over time. Hence, a supplier of funds receives derivative tokens in exchange
for supplied liquidity, representing his share in the total value of the liquidity
pool for the underlying asset. The most prominent PLFs are Compound [7] and
Aave [4], with 749m USD and 1.39bn USD in total funds locked, respectively,
at the time of writing [10]. For a more in-depth explanation of the workings of
PLFs, we direct the reader to [12].
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2.5 Oracles
One of the major challenges smart contracts face concerns access to off-chain
information, i.e. data that does not natively exist on-chain. Oracles are data feeds
into smart contracts and provide a mechanism for accessing off-chain information
through some third party. In DeFi, oracles are commonly used for price feed data
to determine the real-time price of assets. For instance, via the Compound Open
Price Feed [8], vetted third party reporters sign off on price data using a known
public key, where the resulting feed can be relied upon by smart contracts.
2.6 Liquidity Incentives
As the total liquidity in DeFi is fragmented across protocols, a constant com-
petition over deposits persists, commonly referred to as liquidity mining. Apart
from earning interest on deposited funds on PLFs or liquidity provider fees on
automated market makers, liquidity providers may also earn rewards by receiv-
ing protocol-specific tokens, as seen for automated market makers [1,2], PLFs
[7], and yield aggregators [3]. While these tokens are typically intended for par-
ticipation in protocol governance, they are also tradable on the open market and
thus provide further financial incentive to liquidity providers.
2.7 Stablecoins
An alternative to volatile cryptoassets is given by stablecoins, which are priced
against a peg and can be either custodial or non-custodial. For custodial sta-
blecoins (e.g. USDC [6]), tokens represent a claim of some off-chain reserve asset,
such as fiat currency, which has been entrusted to a custodian. Non-custodial
stablecoins (e.g. DAI [17]) seek to establish price stability via economic mech-
anisms specified by smart contracts. For a thorough discussion on stablecoin
design, we direct the reader to [14].
3 Methodology
In this section, we describe our methodology for the different analyses we perform
with regard to leveraging on a PLF. To be able to quantify the extent of leveraged
positions over time, we first introduce a state transition framework for tracking
the borrow and supply positions across all markets on a given PLF. We then
describe how we instantiate this framework on the Compound protocol using
on-chain events data.
3.1 Definitions
Throughout the paper, we use the following definitions in the context of PLFs:
Market A smart contract acting as the intermediary of loanable funds for a
particular cryptoasset, where users supply and borrow funds.
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Supply Funds deposited to a market that can be loaned out to other users and
used as collateral against depositors’ own borrow positions.
Borrow Funds loaned out to users of a market.
Collateral Funds available to back a user’s aggregate borrow positions.
Locked funds Funds remaining in the PLF smart contracts, equal to the dif-
ference between supplied and borrowed funds.
Supplier A user who deposits funds to a market.
Borrower A user who borrows funds from a market. Since a borrow position
must be collateralized, a borrower must also be a supplier.
Liquidator A user who purchases a borrower’s supply in a market when the
borrower’s collateral to borrow ratio falls below some threshold.
3.2 States on a PLF
In this section, we provide a formal definition of the state of a PLF. We note Pt
to be the global state of a PLF at time t. For brevity, in the following definitions,
we assume that all the values are at a given time t. We define the global state
for the PLF as
P = (M, Γ,P, Λ)
where M is the set of states of individual markets, Γ is the price the Oracle
used, P is the set of states of individual participants and Λ is the close factor
of the protocol, which specifies the upper bound on the amount of collateral a
liquidator may purchase.
We define the state of an individual market m ∈M as
m = (I,B,S, C)
where I is the market’s interest rate model, B is the total borrows, S is the total
supply of deposits, and C is the collateralization ratio.
Pm is the state of all participants in market m and the positions of a partic-
ipant P in this market is defined as
Pm = (Bm, Sm)
where Bm and Sm are respectively the total borrows positions and total supplied
deposits of a market participant in market m.
For a given market m, the total deposits supplied Sm is thus given by:
Sm =
∑
Pm∈Pm
Sm (1)
Similarly, the market’s total borrows Bm is given by:
Bm =
∑
Pm∈Pm
Bm (2)
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Event Description State variables affected
Borrow A new borrow position is created. B
Mint cTokens are minted for new deposits. S
RepayBorrow A borrow position is partially/fully repaid. B
LiquidateBorrow A borrow position is liquidated. B, S
Redeem cTokens are used to redeem deposits of the un-
derlying asset.
S
NewCollateralFactor The collateral factor for the associated market is
updated.
C
AccrueInterest Interest has accrued for the associated market
and its borrow index is updated.
B
NewInterestRateModel The interest rate model for the associated market
is updated.
I
NewInterestParams The parameters of the interest rate model for the
associated market are updated.
I
NewCloseFactor The close factor is updated. Λ
Fig. 1: The events emitted by the Compound protocol smart contracts used for
initiating state transitions and the states affected by each event.
The state of a participant P is liquidable if the following holds:∑
m∈M
{
[Sm · C + I(Sm)] · Γ (m)
}
−
∑
m∈M
{
[Bm + I(Bm)] · Γ (m)
}
< 0 (3)
where Γ (m) returns the price of the underlying asset denominated in a pre-
defined numraire (e.g. USD), I(Sm) returns the interest earned with supply Sm
and I(Bm) returns the interest accrued with borrow Bm.
The transition from a state of a market m from time t to t + 1 is given by
some state transition σ, such that mt
σ−→ mt+1.
3.3 States and the Compound PLF
For our analysis, we apply our state transition framework to the Compound
PLF. Therefore, we briefly present the workings of Compound in the context of
our framework.
State Transitions We initiate state transitions via events emitted from the
Compound protocol smart contracts. We provide an overview of the state vari-
ables affected by Compound events in Table 1.
Funds Supplied Every market on Compound has an associated “cToken”,
a token that continuously appreciates against the underlying asset as interest
accrues. For every deposit in a market, a newly-minted amount of the market’s
associated cToken is transferred to the depositor. Therefore, rather than tracking
the total amount of the underlying asset supplied, we account the total deposits
of an asset supplied by a market participant in the market’s cTokens. Likewise,
we account the total supply of deposits in the market in cTokens.
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Funds Borrowed A borrower on Compound must use cTokens as collateral
for his borrow position. The borrowing capacity equals the current value of the
supply multiplied by the collateral factor for the asset. For example, given an
exchange rate of 1 DAI = 50 cDAI, a collateral factor of 0.75 for DAI and a price
of 1 DAI = 1 USD, a holder of 500 cDAI (10 DAI) would be permitted to borrow
up to 7.50 USD worth of some other asset on Compound. Therefore, as funds
are borrowed, an individual’s total borrow position, as well as the respective
market’s total borrows are updated.
Interest The accrual of interest is tracked per market via a borrow index, which
corresponds to the total interest accrued in the market. The borrow index of a
market is also used to determine and update the total debt of a borrower in the
respective market. When funds are borrowed, the current borrow index for the
market is stored with the borrow position. When additional funds are borrowed
or repaid, the latest borrow index is used to compute the difference of accrued
interest since the last borrow and added to the total debt.
Liquidation A borrower on Compound is eligible for liquidation should his total
supply of collateral, i.e. the value of the sum of the borrower’s cToken holdings
per market, weighted by each market’s collateral factor, be less than the value of
the borrower’s aggregate debt (Equation (3)). The maximum amount of debt a
liquidator may pay back in exchange for collateral is specified by the close factor
of a market.
4 Analysis
In this section, we present the results of the analysis performed with the frame-
work outlined in Section 3. We analyze data from the Compound protocol [16]
over a period ranging from May 7, 2019—when the first Compound markets
were deployed on the Ethereum main network—to September 6, 2020. The full
list of contracts considered for our analysis can be found in Appendix A. When
analyzing a single market, we choose the market for DAI, as it is the largest by
one order of magnitude.
4.1 Borrowers and Suppliers
We first examine the total number of borrowers and suppliers on Compound
by considering any Ethereum account that, at any time within the observation
period, either exhibited a non-zero cToken balance or borrowed funds for any
Compound market. The change in the number of borrowers and suppliers over
time is displayed in Figure 2a.
We see that the total number of suppliers always exceeds the total number of
borrowers. This is because on Compound, one can only borrow against funds he
supplied, which automatically makes the borrower also a supplier. Interestingly,
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Fig. 2: Number of active accounts and amount of funds on Compound over time.
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(b) Distribution of borrowed funds.
Fig. 3: Cumulative distribution of funds in USD. Accounts are bucketed in bins
of 10, i.e. a single bar represents the sum of 10 accounts.
the number of suppliers has become increasingly bigger relative to the number
of borrowers over time. There is notable sudden jump in both the number of
suppliers and borrowers in June 2020.
In terms of total deposits, a very similar trend is observable in Figure 2b,
which shows that at the same time, the total supplied deposits increased, while
the total borrows followed shortly after. Furthermore, the total funds borrowed
exceeded the total funds locked for the first time in July 2020 and have remained
so until the end of the examined period. We discuss the reasons behind this in
the next part of this section.
Despite the similarly increasing trend for the number of suppliers/borrowers
and amount of supplied/borrowed funds, we can see in Figure 3 that the majority
of funds are borrowed and supplied only by a small number of accounts. For
instance, for the suppliers in Figure 3a, the top user and top 10 users supply
27.4% and 49% of total funds, respectively. For the borrowers shown in Figure 3b,
the top user accounts for 37.1%, while the top 10 users account for 59.9% of total
borrows.
4.2 The COMP Governance Token
The sudden jumps seen in Figures 2a and 2b can be explained by the launch of
Compound’s governance token, COMP, on June 15, 2020. The COMP governance
token allows holders to participate in voting, create proposals, as well as delegate
voting rights. In order to empower Compound stakeholders, new COMP is minted
every block and distributed amongst borrowers and suppliers in each market.
Initially, COMP was allocated proportionally to the accrued interest per mar-
ket. However, the COMP distribution model was modified via a governance vote
on July 2, 2020, such that the borrowing interest rate was removed as a weight-
ing mechanism in favor of distributing COMP per market on a borrowing demand
basis, i.e. per USD borrowed. The distributed COMP per market is shared equally
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Fig. 4: Collateral locked over time, showing how close the amounts are from being
liquidated. Positions can be liquidated when the ratio drops below 100%.
between a market’s borrowers and suppliers, who receive COMP proportionally to
their borrowed and supplied amounts, respectively. Hence, a Compound user is
incentivized to increase his borrow position as long as the borrowing cost does
not exceed the value of his COMP earnings, which presumably explains why the
total borrows surpass the total amount locked after the COMP launch, as seen in
Figure 2b.
4.3 Liquidation Risk
Given the high increase in the number of total funds borrowed and supplied,
as well as the decrease in liquidity relative to total borrows, we seek to identify
and quantify any changes in liquidation risk on Compound since the launch of
COMP. Figure 4 shows the total USD value of collateral on Compound and how
close collateral amounts are from liquidation. In addition to the substantial in-
crease in the total value of collateral on Compound since the launch of COMP, the
risk-seeking behavior of users has also changed. This can be seen by examining
collateral to borrow ratios, where since beginning of July, 2020, a total of ap-
proximately 350m to 600m USD worth of collateral has been within a 5% price
range of becoming liquidable. However, it should be noted that the likelihood of
the amount of this collateral becoming liquidable highly depends on the price
volatility of the collateral asset.
In order to examine how liquidation risk differs across markets, we measure
for the largest market on Compound, namely DAI, the sensitivity of collateral
becoming liquidable given a decrease in the price of DAI. Figure 5 shows the
amount of aggregate collateral liquidable at the historic price, as well as at a 3%
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Fig. 5: Sensitivity analysis of the liquidable collateral amount given DAI price
movement. COMP launch date is marked by the dashed vertical line.
and 5% decrease relative to the historic price for DAI. We mark the date on
which the COMP governance token launched with a dashed line. It can be seen
that since the launch of COMP, 3% and 5% price decreases would have resulted in a
substantially higher amount of liquidable collateral. In particular, a 3% decrease
would have turned collateral worth in excess of 10 million USD liquidable.
4.4 Liquidations and Liquidators
In order to better understand the implications of the increased liquidation risk
since the launch of COMP, we examine historical liquidations on Compound and
subsequently measure the efficiency of liquidators.
Historical Liquidations The increased risk-seeking behavior suggested by the
low collateral to borrow ratios presented in the previous section are in accordance
with the trend of rising amount of liquidated collateral since the introduction of
COMP. The total value of collateral liquidated on Compound over time is shown
in Figure 6. It can be seen that the majority of this collateral was liquidated
on a few occasions, perhaps most notably on Black Thursday (March 12, 2020),
July 29, 2020 (DAI deviating from its peg), and in early September 2020 (ETH
price drop).
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Fig. 6: Amount (in USD) of liquidated collateral from May 2019 to August 2020.
Liquidation Efficiency We measure the efficiency of liquidators as the number
of blocks elapsed since a borrow position has become liquidable and the position
actually being liquidated. The overall historical efficiency of liquidators is shown
as a cumulative distribution function in Figure 7, from which it can be seen
that approximately 60% of the total liquidated collateral (35 million USD) was
liquidated within the same block as it became liquidable, suggesting that the
majority of liquidations occur via bots and are very efficient. After 2 blocks
have elapsed (on average half a minute), 85% of liquidable collateral has been
liquidated, while after 16 blocks this value amounts to 95%.
It is worth noting that liquidation efficiency has been skewed by the more
recent liquidation activities which were of a much larger scale than when the pro-
tocol was first launched. Specifically, in 2019, only about 26% of the liquidations
occurred in the block during which the position became liquidable, compared to
70% in 2020. This resulted in some lost opportunities for liquidators as shown
in Figure 5. The account 0xd062eeb318295a09d4262135ef0092979552afe6, for in-
stance, had more than 3,000,000 USD worth of ETH as collateral exposed at
block 8,796,900 for the duration of a single block: the account was roughly 20
USD shy of the collaterization threshold but eventually escaped liquidation. If
a liquidator had captured this opportunity, he could have bought half of this
collateral (given the close factor of 0.5), at a 10% discount, resulting in a profit
of 150,000 USD for a single transaction. It is clear that with such stakes, par-
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Fig. 7: Number of blocks elapsed from the time a position can be liquidated to
actual liquidation, shown as a CDF.
ticipants were incentivized to improve liquidation techniques, resulting in a high
level of liquidation speed and scale.
4.5 Summary
In this section, we have analyzed the Compound protocol with a focus on liq-
uidations. We have found that despite the number of suppliers and borrowers
having increased with time, the total amount of funds supplied and borrowed
remain extremely concentrated among a small set of participants.
We have also seen that the introduction of the COMP governance token has
changed how users interact with the protocol and the amount of risk that they
are willing to take. Users now borrow vastly more than before, with the total
amount borrowed surpassing the total amount locked. Due to excessive borrow-
ing without a sufficiently safe amount of supplied funds, borrow positions now
face a higher liquidation risk, such that a crash of 3% in the price of DAI could
result in an aggregate liquidation value of over 10 million USD.
Finally, we have shown that the liquidators have become more efficient with
time, and are currently able to capture a majority of the liquidable funds in-
stantly.
5 Discussion
In this section, we enumerate several points that we deem important for the
future development of PLFs and DeFi protocols. We first discuss ho governance
tokens can, intentionally or not, change how users behave within a protocol.
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Subsequently, we discuss the contagion effect that user behavior in a protocol
can have on another protocol.
As analyzed in Section 4, the distribution of the COMP token has vastly
changed the Compound landscape and user behavior. Until the introduction
of the token, borrowing was costly due to the payable interest, which implies a
negative cash flow for the borrower. Therefore, a borrower would only borrow if
he could justify this negative cash flow with some application external to Com-
pound. With the introduction of this token, borrowing started to yield a positive
cash flow because of the monetary value of the governance token. This creates a
situation where both suppliers and borrowers end up with a positive cash flow,
inducing users to maximize both their supply and borrow. This model is, how-
ever, only sustainable when the price of the COMP token remains sufficiently high
to keep this cash flow positive for borrowers. This directly results in users taking
increasingly higher risk in an attempt to gain larger monetary rewards, with
liquidators making more risk-free profit from their operations.
This behavior also indirectly affected other protocols, in particular DAI. The
price of DAI is aimed to be pegged to 1 USD resting on an arbitrage mechanism,
whereby token holders are incentivized to buy/sell DAI as soon as the price moves
below/above 1 USD, respectively. However, a rational user seeking to maximize
profit will not sell his DAI if holding it somewhere else would yield higher profits.
This was precisely what was happening with Compound, whose users locking
their DAI received higher yields in the form of COMP, than from selling DAI at
a premium, thereby resulting in upward price pressure [9]. Interestingly, DAI
deviating from its peg also has a negative effect for Compound users. Indeed,
as we saw in Section 4, many Compound users might have been overconfident
about the price stability of DAI and thus only collateralize marginally above the
threshold. This has resulted in large amounts being liquidated due to the actual,
higher extent of the volatility in the DAI price.
6 Related Work
In this section we briefly discuss existing work related to this paper.
A thorough analysis of the Compound protocol with respect to market risks
faced by participants was done by [13]. The authors employ agent-based mod-
eling and simulation to perform stress tests in order to show that Compound
remains safe under high volatility scenarios and high levels of outstanding debt.
Furthermore, the authors demonstrate the potential of Compound to scale to
accommodate a larger borrow market while maintaining a low default proba-
bility. This differs to our work as we conduct a detailed empirical analysis on
Compound, focusing on how agent behavior under different incentive structures
on Compound has affected the protocol’s state with regards to liquidation risk.
A first in-depth analysis on PLFs is given by [12]. The authors provide a tax-
onomy on interest rate models employed by PLFs, while also discussing market
liquidity, efficiency and interconnectedness across PLFs. As part of their anal-
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ysis, the authors examine the cumulative percentage of locked funds solely for
the Compound markets DAI, ETH, and USDC.
In [15], the authors show how markets for stablecoins are exposed to delever-
aging feedback effects, which can cause periods of illiquidity during crisis.
The authors of [11] demonstrate how various DeFi lending protocols are
subject to different attack vectors such as governance attacks and undercollater-
alization. In the context of the proposed governance attack, the lending protocol
the authors focus on is Maker [17].
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we presented the first in-depth empirical analysis of liquida-
tions on Compound, one of the largest PLFs in terms of total locked funds,
from May 7, 2019 to September 6, 2020. We analyzed agents’ behavior and
in particular how much risk they are willing to take within the protocol. Fur-
thermore, we assessed how this has changed with the launch of the Compound
governance token COMP, where we found that agents take notably higher risks
in anticipation of higher earnings. This resulted in variations as little as 3% in
an asset’s price being able to cause over 10 million USD worth of collateral be-
coming liquidable. In order to better understand the potential consequences, we
then measured the efficiency of liquidators, namely how quickly new liquidation
opportunities are captured. Liquidators’ efficiency was found to have improved
significantly over time, reaching 70% of instant liquidations. Lastly, we demon-
strated how overconfidence in the price stability of DAI, increased the overall
liquidation risk faced by Compound participants. Rather ironically, many Com-
pound participants wishing to make the most of the new incentive scheme ended
up causing higher volatility in DAI—a dominant asset of the platform, resulting
in liquidation of their own assets. This is not Compound’s misdoing, but rather
highlights the to date unknown dynamics of incentive structures across different
DeFi protocols.
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A Monitored contracts
In Figure 8, we provide a list of contracts we monitored in our analysis.
Name Address
cBAT 0x6c8c6b02e7b2be14d4fa6022dfd6d75921d90e4e
cDAI 0x5d3a536e4d6dbd6114cc1ead35777bab948e3643
cETH 0x4ddc2d193948926d02f9b1fe9e1daa0718270ed5
cREP 0x158079ee67fce2f58472a96584a73c7ab9ac95c1
cSAI 0xf5dce57282a584d2746faf1593d3121fcac444dc
cUSDC 0x39aa39c021dfbae8fac545936693ac917d5e7563
cUSDT 0xf650c3d88d12db855b8bf7d11be6c55a4e07dcc9
cWBTC 0xc11b1268c1a384e55c48c2391d8d480264a3a7f4
cZRX 0xb3319f5d18bc0d84dd1b4825dcde5d5f7266d407
Comptroller 0x3d9819210a31b4961b30ef54be2aed79b9c9cd3b
Open Oracle Price Data 0x02557a5e05defeffd4cae6d83ea3d173b272c904
Uniswap Anchored View 0x9b8eb8b3d6e2e0db36f41455185fef7049a35cae
Fig. 8: Monitored contracts
